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Remarks
Remarks on the Occasion of the
Creation of a Joint Degree Program
in Law and Labor Relations/
Human Resources
The University of Rhode Island Schmidt Labor Research
Center and the Roger Williams University School of Law now offer
a joint degree program for students interested in extensive study of
the increasingly complex employment relationship. Through for-
mal coordination of the curricula of the two institutions, students
can earn a J.D. and a M.S. in four years. This program broadens
the existing relationship between the two institutions, which offer
joint degree programs in marine affairs and community planning.
At a ceremony to mark the establishment of the new program,
Professor Stewart Schwab of the Cornell Law School, a noted inter-
disciplinary scholar in the area of labor and employment law, de-
livered a lecture at the URI Alan Shawn Feinstein College of
Continuing Education in Providence. The following essay, in
which Professor Schwab explores the benefits and challenges of in-
terdisciplinary study and analyzes some data about employment
discrimination in Rhode Island, is based on that lecture.
The joint degree program was conceived by Professor Michael
Yelnosky of Roger Williams University School of Law and Profes-
sor Charles T. Schmidt, Jr., founder and director emeritus of the
Schmidt Labor Research Center. The program would not exist,
however, if not for the efforts of the late Terry Thomason, Professor
Schmidt's immediate successor at the Labor Research Center.
Sadly, Professor Thomason died in the Spring of 2002, shortly
before the first group of joint degree program students received
their degrees.
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Studying Labor Law and Human
Resources in Rhode Island*
Stewart J. Schwab**
Our task today is to celebrate, inaugurate, and educate. Law-
yers demanded the education part of the talk because they love
double counting whenever possible. The lawyers in our audience
get Continuing Legal Education credits for attending. That's just
one illustration of how to think like a lawyer-kill as many birds
with as few stones as possible.
Lawyers are often accused of talking in an arcane language
that no one else can understand. Labor-relations people are some-
times thought to be either pie-in-the-sky optimists or Marxist-in-
spired anarchists. Human-relations professionals are sometimes
said to be hypocrites giving a fake smile to employees while looking
solely at the bottom line. But these are just insults. I come to you
tonight as someone who has been through a joint degree program
myself. At times it is frustrating. At the very least, it teaches one
how to deal with university bureaucracy. But at its best, someone
who has advanced professional training in both law and in labor
and human relations gets something better than what either can
teach alone.
I. THE CHALLENGES OF A J.D./M.S. PROGRAM
The obvious first question that prospective students should
ask is: what are the benefits of enrolling in a joint degree program?
The correct first answer is: the double counting. A J.D. degree nor-
* This paper is based on remarks given by Professor Schwab for the
ceremony to mark the creation of a joint J.D./M.S. program between the Roger
Williams University School of Law and the University of Rhode Island Labor
Research Center. It is dedicated to the memory of Terry Thomason, the late
director of the Labor Research Center and a former graduate student of mine. He
had a gentle, inquiring spirit. Thanks to Michael Yelnosky and Ted Eisenberg for
comments.
** Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A., 1975, Swarthmore College;
Ph.D. (economics), 1981, University ofMichigan; J.D., 1980, University of Michigan.
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mally takes three years of fulltime study. A master's degree takes
two years. A combined J.D./M.S. takes four years; in other words,
the first thing students learn under this program is that three plus
two equals four.
The University of Rhode Island will give credit to several
Roger Williams Law School courses. These include administrative
law, employment law, and labor law. Roger Williams, in turn, will
give law school credit to several URI courses. These include labor
relations and human resources, labor economics, international la-
bor relations, labor relations, and a professional seminar. But de-
spite the close meshing of courses, inevitably students in the
program will face two different experiences in methodology, style
of teaching, and overall "feel." Let us examine the schizophrenic
experience these joint-degree students will face.
The joint J.D./IM.S. training might give students a certain feel-
ing of schizophrenia. The legal training imbibes a love of distinc-
tion, a mistrust of sweeping generalizations, a recognition that the
law has gray areas, and a mistrust or even fear of statistics. Close
attention to facts is a key part of thinking like a lawyer. Reasoning
by analogy and the use of hypotheticals is also an important part of
law school pedagogy.' The danger from the law side is that stu-
dents will develop a cynical attitude about their subjects. Argu-
ments and counter-arguments are always possible, and the lawyer
is simply a hired gun whose task is to provide the best possible
argument with little concern for the "truth."
The skills and instincts of the human resource professional are
quite different. They are taught to understand the history and so-
ciology of the workplace, and they strive to obtain an understand-
ing of what works and what does not work in the workplace. The
good student will also be well-versed in statistics. They will have
examined and perhaps conducted surveys, and in general be far
more comfortable with data than the typical law student. The dan-
ger of a human-resources education, however, is that it leads to
fuzzy "feel good" thinking. Students get a dab of labor economics, a
dose of labor history, and an element of business school offerings.
This may create students who appreciate trends and fads, but may
1. For an interesting essay on analogical reasoning in law, see Emily Sher-
win, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1179 (1999).
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not have a real methodology to serve them over a professional
career.
For example, consider teaching the well-known Soroka case.2
The professor's questions may involve the precise issue in the case
and arguments for its resolution. Student Smith might suggest
that the issue in Soroka is whether an employer unlawfully in-
vaded the job applicants' right to privacy. The professor might ask
student Jones to represent the applicants and summarize the key
arguments on their behalf. The professor continues, "are there
analogous cases the applicants can use for support?" The professor
might then ask another student how the employer might respond.
Further questions suggest weaknesses in the applicants' position:
"Would the employer ever see answers to individual questions? If
not, is this in fact favorable to the employer? Is the mere asking of
the question an invasion of privacy, even if one does not hear the
response?"
The law professor might then continue the Soroka analysis by
altering the facts. "What if a test was given to incumbent workers,
on pain of dismissal? Doesn't this weaken the employer's interest
in having the test?" Alert students may see that an employer has
direct experience with incumbent employees, and therefore has
less need of a test to judge employee's character. "On the other
hand," the professor continues, "isn't the workers' claim strength-
ened when the test is given to incumbents? Compared to job appli-
cants who can say 'take this job and shove it' if the interview
questions become offensive, can incumbent employees easily walk
away and lose their job rather than submit to an offensive test?"
After this peek at a law school class, let me make some general
observations. First, we see how arguments and counter-argu-
ments are central to the pedagogy in a law school class. Second,
the key legal issue was whether the employer had a legal right to
give the test. Little attention was given to whether it was a good
idea for employers to give the test. Third, which side won this case
is of modest pedagogical interest. Notice that the outcome was not
2. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
Soroka dealt with a psychological screening test that was administered to appli-
cants for security positions at a department store. Id. at 79. The Soroka test in-
cluded a number of creepy questions, including such yes/no questions as "My soul
sometimes leaves my body," "I believe there is a Devil and a Hell in afterlife," and
"I have never indulged in any unusual sex practices." Id. at 80.
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even mentioned in the sketch above.3 Particular facts were so im-
portant that a single overall rule is unlikely to arise from one case.
This is especially so in a common-law subject like privacy rights in
employment law, where each state court in our fifty-state federal
system could, in theory at least, have its own rule. Because a clear
rule is unlikely to come from a single case, there is little need to
focus on the outcome of the single case.
Now let's contrast how a human resources class on psychologi-
cal testing might be conducted. First, the professor would begin
with the lecture on testing. The background reading (which stu-
dents often will not read until after the class, in contrast to law
school) could be a textbook article on testing. There would be no
pretense of grilling students, even by professors that encourage
discussion.
Topics for discussion would emphasize how prevalent the tests
are. Much of the class discussion would focus on how well the test
works. Is the test able to spot bad workers, and how often does the
test label good workers as bad workers? In other words, the dis-
cussion would focus on type-1 versus type-2 error. Evidence that
the test might hurt workplace morale would be a central concern
for the human-resources class. The professor would likely sketch
the history of testing in the workplace, and would emphasize any
available statistical studies of the effect of testing in the
workplace.
Now the goal of the program we celebrate tonight is that the
jointly trained student can provide a synthesis. This student rec-
ognizes the pros and cons of including a large in an employee hand-
book disclaimer that states: "THE COMPANY CAN FIRE YOU
FOR A GOOD REASON OR A BAD REASON." This student un-
derstands the tradeoff involved: motivating the workforce and
3. For readers desperate to know the outcome, the court of appeals in Soroka
reversed the trial court's order denying a preliminary injunction and remanded the
matter to the trial court for further proceedings on class certification. After addi-
tional wrangling, the parties eventually settled the case for over $2 million. The
2,500 applicants who had taken the invasive test split $1.3 million; $60,000 went
to the four named plaintiffs; and the rest went for attorney's fees. See 89 Ind. Emp.
Rts. (BNA) No. 16 (July 20, 1993) and No. 22 (Oct. 12, 1993). The California Su-
preme Court then dismissed the case as moot pursuant to stipulation by the par-
ties. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 862 P.2d 148 (Cal. 1993). Perhaps this
recounting of the convoluted outcome itself demonstrates why law school classes
are more interested in issues than outcomes.
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staying out of court. An advantage of being a lawyer is that one
knows when the law is not important. A good lawyer knows that
not everything that is lawful should be done (even assuming that
business lawyers can agree that what is unlawful should not be
done). For example, most workers in this country are employed at
will, meaning they can be fired for a good reason, bad reason, or no
reason at all. But this legal presumption does not mean that em-
ployers should fire workers for a bad reason or no reason at all. Too
often, non-lawyers have a vision of the work world that the law
constrains all choices, even when it does not.
To further examine the contrast between the human-resource
professional and the employment lawyer, let us take the related
example of the steps an employer takes before firing a worker. The
lawyer representing the company wants clear documentation of
awful ratings of the worker. Ideally, from the lawyer's perspective,
employees will have signed a waiver of all rights and the employer
will refuse to give an explanation for termination.
By contrast, the human resource manager wants to give a fal-
tering worker a pep talk, emphasizing that the worker is improv-
ing and still has a great future with the company. The human-
resource manager's instinct is always to give one more chance to
the worker.
The J.D./M.S. synthesis recognizes the tradeoffs involved.
Most importantly, this synthesis states that the legal right to fire a
worker does not mean that it is a good idea to fire the worker.
II. THE APPROPRIATE Focus OF THE JOINT PROGRAM: STATE,
REGIONAL, OR NATIONAL
One issue for this new joint program is how it should position
itself. In particular, should it envision itself as a program focusing
on workforce issues in the state of Rhode Island? Or should it
broaden its vision somewhat and emphasize regional issues affect-
ing New England workplaces? Or should it look nationally or even,
in the fashion of the day, globally?
I have no final answers to this question of focus, but in part
the answer depends on two questions of fact: First, where are the
students coming from and going to? Second, how different is
Rhode Island from the northeast region and from the nation? A
new program cannot definitely answer the first question of where
students are coming from and going to, although the program cer-
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tainly has hopes and expectations. I will give a few bits of data
relating to the second question of the uniqueness of Rhode Island
and New England.
From a labor relation's perspective, Rhode Island is more un-
ionized than the rest of the United States. This is especially true
in the public sector. Like the rest of the nation, but perhaps some-
what later, Rhode Island has been undergoing a shift from manu-
facturing to services. This suggests that a joint program in Rhode
Island should spend somewhat more time on union-related issues
(labor law) than a more nationally focused program.
But rather than discuss further industrial relations in Rhode
Island, I want to focus on legal issues: to what degree is Rhode
Island's employment law similar to or distinct from New England
or the nation? But to illustrate the schizophrenic method of some-
one involved in a joint J.D./M.S. program, I propose to address this
question of legal issues by presenting a bunch of statistics.
A. Erosions of Employment-at-Will
One of the major issues in employment law over the last quar-
ter century has been the legal inroads on the traditional employ-
ment-at-will rule-that is, the doctrine that the employer has the
legal right to fire a non-union worker for a good reason, bad reason,
or no reason at all. Courts have carved out three categories of ex-
ceptions to the at-will doctrine. In most states, the earliest erosion
was the recognition of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy. A classic case is recognizing a tort claim for an em-
ployee fired because he refused to perjure himself when a govern-
ment agency was investigating his employer.4
A second at-will exception involves implied contracts. These
can take two forms. Sometimes, courts protect an ostensibly at-
will employee who has worked hard for the company for a long
time, rising from a low position to one of considerable responsibil-
ity. Along the way, the employee received the usual commenda-
tions, pats on the back, and assurances that he had a future with
the company. When the employee is suddenly discharged after
many years of this service, a court might determine that an im-
plied-in-fact contract existed and that the employee could not be
4. See Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959).
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fired without good cause.5 A second type of implied-in-fact con-
tract comes from a company handbook describing the grounds and
procedures for dismissal. A number of courts in recent years have
considered these handbooks to be legally enforceable contracts.
The third erosion of employment-at-will comes from courts
that have implied into employment contracts a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. When, for example, an employer fires a
sales person who has done all the work for a large sale shortly
before his commission is due, courts have held this violates the cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing. 6
Rhode Island is in a distinct minority in the nationwide trend
to erode the at-will employment rule. Only three states have not
adopted any of these exceptions, and Rhode Island is one of them
(Florida and Georgia are the other two). Forty-three states have
adopted some version of the implied contract exception, a different
set of 43 states has adopted the tort of wrongful discharge and vio-
lation of public policy, and 11 states now recognize the tort of
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
B. Rhode Island Employment Discrimination Cases
Another way to look at the distinctiveness of Rhode Island is
to look at federal court data gathered by the Administrative Office
of the U.S. courts. 7 The main lesson I want to glean from these
data is the degree to which Rhode Island differs from the rest of
the northeast region and from the country as a whole.
These data come from official data collected by the Adminis-
trative Office (A.O.) of the U.S. Courts. The database covers all
civil cases terminated between 1987 and 2000.8 My strategy is to
compare cases from the District of Rhode Island with other cases in
the New England region (Maine, New Hampshire and Massachu-
setts)9 and the nation as a whole.
5. The classic illustration of this implied-in-fact doctrine is Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
6. This was the fact pattern in the classic good-faith case of Fortune v. Nat'l
Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
7. All the data presented here are available at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:
8090/questata.htm.
8. The data limited to trials are available for a longer period, from 1978-
2000.
9. Another possibility would be to compare Rhode Island to the five other
states in what is traditionally called New England, i.e., include Vermont and Con-
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FIGURE 1 EMPLOYMENT CATEGORIES AS SHARE OF
FEDERAL CIL DOCKET, 1987-2000
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Figure 1 is designed to show the prevalence of various types of
labor employment cases as a share of the entire federal civil
docket. The Administrative Office places each civil case into one of
about 100 categories, including seven different types of labor em-
ployment categories. The most prevalent employment category is
what the administrative office calls "Other Civil Rights: Jobs"
(Category No. 442), which I will call discrimination cases. Most of
the cases in this category raise claims under Title VII (covering
race and sex discrimination), under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (covering disability discrimination), or under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (covering age discrimination).
Nationally, over six percent (6.01%) of the federal civil docket
comes from this category. The New England region has substan-
tially fewer discrimination cases, comprising less than four percent
(3.98%) of its docket. Rhode Island has even fewer discrimination
cases, comprising only 3.32% of its federal civil docket.
necticut. I chose not to do this because Vermont and Connecticut are district courts
in the Second Circuit, while Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Rhode
Island (along with Puerto Rico, which I also did not include for comparison) are
districts in the First Circuit.
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The next most prevalent category of employment cases is ER-
ISA cases, which cover claims involving health insurance, pension
and other employer-provided benefits. As Figure 1 shows, Rhode
Island (3.03%) trails the nation (3.70%) in the percentage of federal
civil cases involving ERISA claims. The rest of New England, by
contrast, has a higher proportion of ERISA cases (4.17%) than does
the nation.
Each of the other five categories of employment cases com-
prises less than one percent of the docket, both locally and nation-
ally. No clear trend emerges on whether Rhode Island has
proportionally more or fewer cases than the region or nation.
Rhode Island has relatively fewer Labor Management Relations
Act cases (union claims) than the nation or region, but relatively
more Fair Labor Standards Act cases (minimum wage, overtime
hours, and child labor) than the nation.
FIGURE 2 PLAINTIFF WIN RATES AT TRIAL, 1978-2000
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The succeeding figures look more closely at the largest cate-
gory of employment cases, those involving discrimination claims,
and limits the focus from all terminated cases to those terminated
after a judge or jury trial. Figure 2 shows the plaintiffs win rate at
trial. Overall, Rhode Island plaintiffs are significantly more suc-
cessful than plaintiffs regionally or nationally. Rhode Island plain-
tiffs win nearly half (49.1%) of their trials, compared to 43.5
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percent for other New England plaintiffs and 44 percent for plain-
tiffs nationwide. In discrimination cases, plaintiffs are substan-
tially less successful. Nationwide, discrimination plaintiffs win
only 28.1 percent of their trials. Discrimination plaintiffs are
somewhat more successful in Rhode Island and New England (win-
ning 32.6% and 33.8% of their trials, respectively), but even in
Rhode Island the gap in win rates at trial between discrimination
and other plaintiffs is large.
FIGURE 3 MEAN AwARD TO SUCCESSFUL PLAINTIFFS AT TRIAL
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Figure 3 shows the mean awards in cases where plaintiffs
have won an award at trial. Here, Rhode Island plaintiffs stand
out, obtaining far higher awards than plaintiffs in the region or
nation. Looking at all civil cases, the mean award for Rhode Island
plaintiffs is $4,642,000. This is more than double the mean award
for other plaintiffs in the region ($1,730,000), which is itself consid-
erably higher than the nationwide average award of $1,302,000.
The pattern of higher awards in Rhode Island holds true for dis-
crimination trials as well. On average, discrimination plaintiffs in
Rhode Island receive more than twice the award than plaintiffs re-
gionally, and four times the national average.
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FIGURE 4 MEDIAN $ AWARDS IN SUCCESSFUL
FEDERAL TRIALS, 1978-2000
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Figure 4 compares median awards in Rhode Island, the region,
and the nation. Again, the median discrimination plaintiff and the
median plaintiff overall receives a far higher award in Rhode Is-
land than elsewhere.
A few caveats about the award data are in order. First, while
most of the Administrative Office data are consistent with actual
courthouse records, the award data in the Administrative Office
database are notoriously inaccurate. 10 Second, the highest award
recorded in the database is $9,999,999. Thus, all awards of
$10,000,000 or more are under-reported. Third, the Rhode Island
awards data are based on relatively few trials. In the period 1978-
2000, the Administrative Office recorded an award in only 274
Rhode Island trials, and only 12 of these trials were in discrimina-
tion cases."
10. See Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional
Tort Cases: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as De-
fendant, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 719 (1988) (comparing Administrative Office data with
courthouse records in three districts).
11. The ratio of discrimination trials in Rhode Island reporting awards to all
trials in Rhode Island reporting awards, 12/274 = 4.4%, is roughly comparable to
the fraction of discrimination trials to all trials, 43/875 = 4.9%. Thus, no obvious
distortion appears in the fraction of discrimination and overall trials in Rhode Is-
land that report awards. However, in Rhode Island a far higher percentage of win-
ning discrimination trials report awards (12 awards reported out of 14 successful
trials = 85.7%) than do winning trials overall (274 out of 430 = 63.7%).
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Several experienced Rhode Island lawyers in the audience ex-
pressed skepticism at the high awards reported in discrimination
cases. To check the accuracy of the Administrative Office awards
data in Rhode Island, I gave the law review editors assisting with
this piece the docket numbers of the 12 Rhode Island discrimina-
tion trials and asked them to go to the clerk's office in the federal
district court in Rhode Island and ask for the record. The results
are reported in Table A.
The Administrative Office award amount cannot be checked in
one case (#83-0099), because the docket sheet indicates an order
for money damages but does not show the amount. In the other 11
cases, the A.O. amounts were accurate in six cases and essentially
accurate in a seventh case (#75-0036), apparently including the
compensatory damages but not the liquidated damages.
In four cases, however, the Administrative Office vastly over-
stated the award. In two cases, the Administrative Office recorded
an award of 9999, meaning $9,999,000-the largest award that
can be awarded under the Administrative Office coding scheme.
The docket sheets in these two cases show modest awards that
were later dismissed as part of a settlement. Perhaps the clerk
meant simply to indicate an unusual procedure by entering 9999,
although the directions say that 9999 should be used to indicate an
award of $9,999,000 or higher. In the other two cases, the Admin-
istrative Office overstated the award by exactly 100 times (two ze-
ros), suggesting a confusion with recording the amount in
thousands of dollars, or perhaps a confusion in the digits involved
with dollars and cents. The overstatement in these four cases
causes the Administrative Office data to seriously overstate the
mean and median awards.
This quick check of Administrative Office data leads to two
tentative suggestions. 12 First, perhaps the Administrative Office
should ask personnel to record actual dollar amounts of the
awards, rather than truncating to thousands of dollars, which can
introduce mistakes. In our survey, the only serious mistakes oc-
curred when the Administrative Office recorded a four-digit award
(indicating a supposed award of millions of dollars). Researchers
should be particularly cautious about giving credibility to Adminis-
12. For a study on the extent of Administrative Office coding errors in 299 tort
cases see Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Liti-
gation: An Empirical Comparison (on file with author).
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trative Office indications of multi-million dollar awards. Interest-
ingly, however, the awards were not overstated by a factor of
1,000, which might suggest a failure to truncate by 1,000. Rather,
the awards were off by a factor of 100, perhaps indicating a prob-
lem with including cents in an award. Second, Administrative Of-
fice personnel should be warned about the use of 9999 as a
monetary award. Both cases with this coding were highly
inaccurate.
In sum, what should we make of these figures? The basic
point is that Rhode Island tracks the nation and region in some
respects. In particular, both in Rhode Island and the region and
nation, discrimination plaintiffs win less often at trial than other
plaintiffs do. In other respects, Rhode Island appears distinctive.
Its federal docket is less dominated than the nation's docket is by
discrimination cases. Further, the success rate of Rhode Island
plaintiffs is higher than the national success rate. Finally, accord-
ing to the Administrative Office, awards to successful plaintiffs at
trial appear far higher in Rhode Island than elsewhere, both in
discrimination and other cases. A check of the docket sheets shows
that we should be skeptical of this finding, however, at least for
discrimination cases.
What this ultimately means, I leave to the future students in
the joint J.DJM.S. program, and wish them successful studies and
exciting careers.
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